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Introduction
It is now almost 20 years since Jones & Kierzkowski (1990) have …rst pointed out the emergence of a new trend in globalization that was made possible mainly because of advances in the technology of transportation and communication: the fragmentation of production across borders. In the 1990s, this phenomenon became known as outsourcing. Krugman (1995) was the …rst to argue that an increased tendency towards outsourcing could be a partial explanation for the rising skill-premium in wages observed to a varying degree in many advanced industrial countries. Feenstra & Hanson (1997) were the …rst to o¤er a theoretical model for this type of explanation, with the important property that outsourcing would lead to the same e¤ect on the skill-premium in both, the "North" (where outsourcing takes place) and the "South"(the target country of such outsourcing activities). Subsequently, a sizable literature has developed, focusing either on the speci…c conditions that favor outsourcing, or on the e¤ects that it has on the outsourcing country's wages, employment and welfare. In this process the terminology has undergone certain changes, whereby outsourcing relates to procurement via market-based transactions versus "in-house" operation of a given stage of the production process. What was originally called international fragmentation or outsourcing is now commonly referred to as o¤shoring, meaning that …rms delocalize certain production-stages to other countries in order to arbitrage on international factor-cost di¤erences. Obviously this can either happen through an "in-house"operation, or through cross-border outsourcing.
Empirical measurement of o¤shoring notoriously su¤ers from certain problems of precise de…nition and data limits, but it is probably fair to conclude from existing studies that the quantitative signi…cance of o¤shoring is relatively low, at least below what would justify the enormous attention that o¤shoring has dawn in the policy debate; see for instance Bhagwati et al. (2004) . More recently, this attention has even increased, due to evidence that the practice of o¤shoring is by no means restricted to production stages intensive in low-skilled-labor and requiring relatively little high-skilled labor. Several authors have been arguing that much of the additional o¤shoring to be expected for the future will probably a¤ect high-skilled workers much more than was the case in the past, maybe even more than low-skilled labor; see for instance Markusen (2006) and Blinder (2006) .
From existing empirical studies, it is relatively easy to quote both, numbers that por- content. They certainly cover much more than would be considered as o¤shoring in theoretical analyses, or in the policy debate. Moreover, inter-country comparisons make little sense, since they do not control for gravity-type e¤ects.
Some authors have looked directly at jobs reported to have fallen victim to o¤shoring, which seems much closer to the notion of o¤shoring, although there's bound to be some blur. Relating the number of such job losses to aggregate job losses over the relevant period (early 2000s) and in the countries considered (mostly the US), o¤shoring seems like a minor nuisance: In three of the four studies reported in OECD (2007), o¤shoring was involved in no more than 1 percent of the job losses. 2 The EU has investigated job losses in a detailed analysis of 3.475 cases of industrial restructuring that took place in various member countries between 2003 and 2006. O¤shoring to countries outside the EU has turned out as an ingredient of restructuring in 10 percent of the cases, and responsible for about 8 percent of the announced job losses. This suggests a somewhat bigger importance, but the authors still conclude that the scale of o¤shoring is "smaller than might be expected". Interestingly, there is no evidence from this exercise that the phenomenon has gained importance during the years. But it is di¢ cult to say what such numbers might tell us. May we conclude that all the discussion about o¤shoring is "much ado"about next to nothing? Or do these …gures simply re ‡ect an underutilized, but large 1 An index value of 0.7 means that on average a country's industries are estimated to rely on If there is substantial disagreement about the quantitative signi…cance of the phenomenon itself, this is aggravated by ambiguous messages about its e¤ects. From an economic policy perspective, three dimension seem important. One is welfare, the question of whether we may view o¤shoring as a phenomenon that enhances the gains from trade. The second is distribution, the main concern being its e¤ect on domestic wages in the o¤shoring country. And …nally, there is concern about displacement e¤ects in industries where o¤shoring is observed. Economic theory suggests that the three dimensions are closely interrelated, but empirical studies have tended to focus on single aspects, mainly looking at either wage or employment e¤ects. Unfortunately, however, the stories presented di¤er widely. 4 In very broad terms, there are two reasons for this. One has to do with the ambiguity regarding measurement of o¤shoring itself; see the preceding paragraph. The second has to do with the lack of clear guidance from theory as to how, exactly, estimation equations should be speci…ed. Both problems, particularly the second, are familiar from the literature on trade and wages.
There are two principal modeling approaches to o¤shoring. One is to follow traditional trade theory, using general equilibrium models. These models may in turn be Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin in nature, taking a long-run view on comparative advantage, or they may be more short-run in nature, assuming factor speci…city as in the Ricardo-Viner model. 5 The strengths of these models is their ability to address welfare and distribu- 3 See OECD (2007, p.90). Blinder (2006) is particularly outspoken in identifying a large potential for o¤shoring, particularly in high-skilled-labor intensive tasks. 4 A convenient survey is found in Belessiotis et al. (2006) . See also Kohler (2007) . 5 This type of literature essentially goes back to Jones & Kierzkowski (1990 o¤shoring as a result of some exogenous change in the cost of cross-border linking of production stages (cost of transportation and/or communication across distance and jurisdictions), which allows for a …ner exploitation of cross country di¤erences in the factor cost of performing di¤erent tasks in production. Such costs will in general also relate to the organizational mode of doing things, such as arms-length transactions versus intra…rm transactions. However, in this …rst approach, these costs are typically treated as a 'black box'. In contrast, the second approach to analyzing o¤shoring is to open this box, thereby also shedding light on the nature of transactional problems that are responsible for whether …rms chose one mode of sourcing over another, in addition to determining where to source their inputs or tasks of production. 6 Typically, however, models in this tradition are somewhat short on factor price e¤ects and distribution, which is arguably a dominating concern of the policy debate.
In this paper, the focus lies squarely on the …rst approach which places much emphasis on factor-cost considerations behind o¤shoring, and on general equilibrium repercussions, but which takes a very simple view on the transaction-costs of o¤shoring, and which largely remains silent about the particular organizational form in which o¤shoring might take place. The results derived obtain independently on the speci…c organizational form.
The model proposed is inspired by the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage and trade. The purpose of the analysis is to shed light on the three di¤erent issues that have been addressed in the empirical literature, and the di¤ering stories that exist where it has sometimes been di¢ cult to interpret the results obtained, largely for lack of a lucid theoretical exposition of the e¤ects in question. The …rst issue relates to the so-called productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring. The second relates to the wage (or more generally factor price) e¤ects of o¤shoring. And the third relates to employment (or more generally reallocation) e¤ects of o¤shoring. The model will show that o¤shoring does indeed incorporate something like a productivity e¤ect. It drives the gains from Deardor¤ (2001a Deardor¤ ( ,2001b Deardor¤ ( ,2005 o¤shoring that many economists almost routinely emphasize when discussing the virtue of o¤shoring, alluding to the general principle of gains from trade. However, the model also suggests that (and explains why) empirical studies should have a hard time identifying such productivity e¤ects. As to the factor price and employment e¤ects, the model will reveal that the a-priori intuition that inspires much of the empirical work ex ante, and is usually invoked ex post in order to interpret the results obtained, is potentially misleading.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two presents a simple two-sector model where production takes place in a continuum of production stages, or tasks, each relying on high-and low-skilled labor, respectively, with a varying skill-intensity which is assumed to be given (Leontief-type technology). I describe the extensive margin of o¤shoring as an endogenous variable. O¤shoring is driven by juxtaposing the factor cost-advantage of some foreign location where low-skilled labor is relatively cheap, and the extra cost of connecting production stages towards …nal goods production. I also introduce the concept of marginal skill intensity of an industry, marginal meaning at the extensive margin of o¤shoring, and the average skill intensity across the entire range of domestic tasks. Section three then turns to a general equilibrium analysis of a simple scenario which involves a reduction of the o¤shoring cost. Importantly, this is allowed to happen independently in both industries. I shall explore in some detail a key di¤erence that arises between two di¤erent fundamental views of o¤shoring. One views o¤shoring as an input-related phenomenon, by de…nition applying to all industries at the same time, while the other views o¤shoring as a phenomenon which is idiosyncratic for each industry, and which always a¤ects both types of labor within the industry. The former concept is used in the recent paper by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , whereas the latter has been used by Kohler (2003) and Kohler (2004b) . It turns out that the wage e¤ects of a reduction in the cost of o¤shoring are dramatically di¤erent for the two modes of o¤shoring. In section four, I explore a scenario where domestic industries respond to a change in …nal goods prices, given exogenously from world markets. Does an industry contract or expand simultaneously at the intensive margin (meaning contraction or expansion of all existing domestic tasks), and at the extensive margin (meaning an expansion or reduction in the measure of tasks performed domestically, as opposed to o¤shore)? I introduce a concept of skill-intensity-di¤erence between industries that allows us to tell whether an industry moves in the same direction on both margins, or whether industries expand (contract)
at the intensive margin, while contracting (expanding) at the extensive margin. Again, it will turn out that the two concepts of o¤shoring hold di¤erent messages. In section …ve I shall draw some conclusions, with special emphasis on implications for empirical modeling.
A Simple Model
Any model of o¤shoring requires to be explicit about the way in which a certain production process may be decomposed, or fragmented, such that various parts may take place at two di¤erent locations (countries) featuring di¤erent factor costs. Factor costs may be di¤erent in two countries either because they have di¤erent technologies, or because they have di¤erent factor prices. I focus on factor price di¤erences as determinants of factor cost advantages, although I do allow for technology di¤erences to play a role as well.
As regards factor cost, I assume that there is a foreign economy with given wage rates for high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor, respectively, denoted by w h and w l . I thus assume a two-factor setup with high-skilled and low-skilled labor as the only inputs. Labor endowments are considered as given exogenously for the larger part of my analysis.
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I also assume two …nal goods, where production is assumed to require a continuum of tasks, each requiring inputs of the two types of labor in a certain ratio, according to a Leontief-type production relationship. It will become evident that the model could be generalized to allow for factor substitution with relatively little e¤ort, but since there are almost zero gains from doing so I stick to the Leontief-case. I use a ih (j) and a il (j) to denote the …xed input coe¢ cients "per unit"of task j in production of good i. 8 The continuous variable j 2 [0; 1] is used to index tasks, and i = f1; 2g is used to index the two goods, or industries. Moreover, f i (j) denotes the "amount"of task j that is required per unit of 7 The model is inspired by Dornbusch, Fischer & Samuelson (1980) , Dixit & Grossman (1982) , Feenstra & Hanson (1997) , and the recent contribution by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006) . See also Kohler (2004) . The distinctive features of the model used here will be emphasized as I go along. 8 Due to Grossman & Roossi-Hansberg (2006) , it has now become standard to talk of tasks, where earlier literature has referred to stages of production, or fragments. Likewise, it has become costumary to use o¤shoring to describe foreign (as opposed to domestic) sourcing of tasks, leaving the precise mode of sourcing indetermined (in-house or outsourcing).
good i. Thus technology is also of the Leontief-type regarding the tasks, in addition to the types of labor used for each task. Essentially, f i (j) measures inverse task-productivities, or the "importance" of di¤erent tasks in production, across the continuum of tasks from j = 0 to j = 1. By appropriate scaling of output-units, I assume a unitary measure of tasks, i.e.,
Notice that this does not imply a uniform distribution of inverse task-productivities (or importance) across j. Using w h and w l to denote the domestic economy's wage rate for high-and low-skilled labor, respectively, the factor-cost per unit of good i, barring any possibility of o¤shoring, is
Suppose now that there is a technology of linking tasks across distance. More speci…-cally, if the home economy produces good i with some of the tasks performed in the other country, then the "amount"of task j that needs to be performed by foreign labor, in order to secure availability of an equivalent to
is allowed to vary across tasks, di¤erently across industries. This employs the notion of iceberg-cost to o¤shoring, capturing all costs involved in "gluing"tasks across locations. 9 We do not dwell on details here, other than the fact that these costs vary across tasks.
We now de…ne
as a measure of the factor cost of o¤shoring that derives from the factor intensity of tasks and the factor price di¤erence between the domestic and the foreign economy. We know from multiple-good-versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory that ranking tasks in such a way that a ih (j)=a il (j) is weakly increasing in j for both goods implies monotonicity of
More speci…cally, for w h =w l > w h = w l the factor-cost-advantage i ( ; j) is non-increasing in j, and vice versa for w h =w l < w h = w l . 10 For 
Cost-minimization requires that …rms delocalize a task
There is a unique cut-o¤ point separating tasks where cost-minimization dictates delocalization, or o¤shoring, and tasks to be performed domestically, provided that i (w h ; w l ; j)/ t i (j) is strongly monotonic in j. A convenient assumption often made is that it strongly decreases in j. The usual interpretation is that w h =w l > w h = w l and the cost of o¤shoring, t i (j), rises in j, or at least that i (w h ; w l ; j)/ t i (j) inherits the factor-cost-based monotonicity from i (w h ; w l ; j).
However, this may seem questionable. It is not the skill-intensity of a task per se that makes it more or less "o¤shorable", but the degree to which it may be described in algorithmic terms, or the degree to which it requires face-to-face contact or complex communication. As argued by Blinder (2005 Blinder ( ,2007a Blinder ( ,2007b and others, it is by no means clear that ranking tasks in terms of "gluing-cost"replicates the ranking in terms of skillintensity. Unless stated otherwise, In what follows I assume that there is a rank-order of tasks such that i (w h ; w l ; j)/ t i (j) decreases monotonically in j, and that this rank order also implies that a ih (j)=a il (j) is rising in j.
I now denote the cost-minimizing cut-o¤ value of j that satis…es
by j i (w h ; w l ). 
with respect to j. This …rst-order-condition simply requires i (w h ; w l ; j)/ t i (j) = 1, and the second-order-condition is satis…ed from the aforementioned monotonicity. It is instructive to consider the partial equilibrium comparative statics of j i , holding factor prices constant. Thus, consider the case where t i (j) = i z i (j), and let there be an exogenous change i < 0. For given domestic wages, this results in an increase in j i which we could derive from the di¤erential of the …rst-order-condition on j i . Intuitively, the ‡atter i (w h ; w l ; j)/ t i (j) with respect to j, the stronger the reaction of the extensive margin of o¤shoring. In turn, a relatively ‡at schedule may arise from a ‡at factor intensity ranking, meaning a relatively homogeneous set of tasks, and/or a ‡at t i (j)-schedule. We might call such an industry relatively sensitive with respect to o¤shoring.
We may also explore o¤shoring e¤ects of changes in factor prices. Any domestic wage change that increases costs at the marginal stage of production, a ih (j i )dw h + a il (j i )dw l > 0, makes the domestic economy uncompetitive at the margin and leads …rms to delocalize further stages until the condition i (w h ; w l ; j)/ t i (j) = 1 is reached. The opposite holds true for wage changes that satisfy a ih (j i )dw h +a il (j i )dw l < 0. Any factor price change that satis…es a ih (j i )dw h + a il (j i )dw l = 0 leaves the extensive margin of o¤shoring una¤ected.
This property will be important when we consider how o¤shoring behaves in the process of industrial restructuring.
The schedule j i (w h ; w l ) describes o¤shoring behavior of industry i, independently on the price of its output, because o¤shoring is purely a matter of cost-minimization. Given our assumptions, there is a lower bound of w l =w h for which j i = 0, and an upper bound for j i = 1. Industries may obviously di¤er in their o¤shoring characteristics, and the schedule j i (w h ; w l ) is a convenient way of describing these characteristic. For the sake of a simpler notation, I have abstained from indicating that j i is also a function of foreign wage rates which we treat as parametric throughout this paper.
It will prove convenient to introduce the distinction between the marginal and the average domestic skill intensity of an industry. The marginal skill-intensity is denoted by
The complementary de…nition of the average skill intensity of the delocalized part of production is denoted by i (w h ; w l ) := a ih (w h ; w l )= a il (w h ; w l ), whereby
Of course, the di¤erence between the marginal and the average skill intensity vanishes 9 as j i approaches 1. Note that the coe¢ cients a is are constant by assumption, While a is depends on domestic wages through the …rst-order condition on j i .
With these de…nitions, we may now move from the partial industry perspective to general equilibrium. We look at a small open economy facing given world prices p 1 and p 2 for the two goods. With o¤shoring, the zero-pro…t-conditions are
with equality if there is any remaining home production in industry i: In line with the theory of e¤ective protection, we may call the left-hand side of (7) the e¤ective price for the domestic value added in industry i. 12 Denoting this e¤ective price by i (p i ; w h ; w l );
we arrive at conventional zero-pro…t-conditions of the following form:
again with equality if industry i is at least partly viable domestically, meaning j i (w h ; w l ) <
1.
The key di¤erence to the conventional zero-pro…t-condition is that instead of the price p i we now have an e¤ective price, which depends on domestic wage rates. It also depends on the technology of o¤shoring, t i (j), which enters through the extensive margin j i ; as well as through the function t i (j) in the integral (6).
It must be re-emphasized that the condition governing the extensive margin of fragmentation is in ‡uenced by the given wage rates in the forgeign economy. In general equilibrium, these zero-pro…t-conditions must be satis…ed simultaneously for all industries. In addition, equilibrium requires full employment
Equations (7) and (9) determine the two domestic wage rates as well as the "gross-size" of the two industries, y 1 and y 2 . The o¤shoring-schedules j i (w h ; w l ) then determine the degree of delocalization in production of the two industries. 12 I have introduced this concept in Kohler (2003) ; see also Kohler (2004b and . 10 3 Gobalization: The Good of It I now proceed to comparative static analysis. First, I consider the oft-quoted story of a "more global village", which in the present modeling setup amounts to a reduction of t i (j). As Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b) have emphasized, for this scenario to have interesting e¤ects, one must assume o¤shoring to be present in the initial equilibrium.
This generates infra-marginal e¤ects. I assume that the cost of service link activities obey t i (j) = i z i (j); and I assume^ i := i / i < 0. Hence, globalization increases the ease with which o¤shoring may take place across the board for all tasks involved in any one industry. I call it the "good of globalization", since it involves a true cost-saving, a reduction in real o¤shoring-cost. In the next section, I will turn to a somewhat less benign form in which globalization presents itself, which is simply a fall in world-market prices of traded goods. However, I want to allow for^ 1 6 =^ 2 . This is a crucial point, much less innocuous than may appear at …rst sight. It has to do with a fundamental property of our o¤shoring technology, and a property which separates this model from Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006). It warrants a brief digression.
In this model, o¤shoring is an industry-speci…c phenomenon, relating to the idiosyncratic way in which the value added process of a certain industry may be sliced up, or fragmented, into di¤erent tasks. Each task, the smallest possible unit of the value added process, requires composite labor according to a Leontief-type technology. Accordingly, the "gluing-cost" for delocalized tasks are also an idiosyncratic element of an industry's technology. Any improvement in this glue (globalization scenario) is thus also an industry-speci…c element, but within the industry it a¤ects all types of labor directly.
Other industries may be a¤ected indirectly through general equilibrium repercussions.
By way of contrast, Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006) de…ne o¤shoring as an inputspeci…c phenomenon, whereby the term input directly relates to a certain type of labor. If globalization allows easier gluing of input-speci…c tasks performed at di¤erent locations, then this directly a¤ects all industries using this input, but it does not directly a¤ect other tasks. Indeed, they are not a¤ected indirectly, as we shall see below.
These are two fundamentally di¤erent perceptions of what o¤shoring is all about.
Both seem to have some merits empirically. The di¤erence between them in terms of formal analysis is best illustrated in the present context if we make a further simplifying assumption. Let me thus assume that the input-coe¢ cients for high-skilled and low-skilled labor are the same across tasks, i.e, a is (j) = a is for s = h; l and i = 1; 2. This assumption, also made by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , is enormously helpful analytically, since it allows us to substitute for foreign factor-cost, using the …rst-order-condition on the extensive margin j i , which now reads as
Notice that we have now replaced t i (j) = i z i (j). I still denote the endogenous margin of o¤shoring by the schedule j i (w h ; w l ); which depends parametrically on foreign wages w h and w l . Replacing accordingly in (5) and (6), we obtain the following zero-pro…t-conditions:
where
The schedule S i [j i (w h ; w l )] captures how changes in the technology of o¤shoring a¤ect the total factor cost of industry i through a change in the cost-minimizing extensive margin j i . A number of things are worth emphasizing about this. 13 Due to the second-ordercondition on j i , we have S i < 1, which re ‡ects the simple fact that o¤shoring leads to a net savings on factor cost. Moreover, note that the shift parameters i have disappeared through substitution, which may seem counter-intuitive. However, they still play a role through determining the equilibrium margins of o¤shoring in the two industries, j 1 and j 2 . It is obvious that S 0 i < 0, and I use ! i := S 0 i j i / S i < 0 to denote the elasticity of the "o¤shoring-savings-factor" S i with respect to j i . And …nally, for j i = 0 we have S i = 1, due to the assumed unitary measure of f i (j).
According to (10) , for constant foreign wage rates, the comparative statics of the extensive margin satis…es|
where i := z 0 i j i / z i > 0 denotes the elasticity of the "gluing-cost" function z i (j), which now drives all movements at the extensive margin, due to the assumption of otherwise homogeneous tasks. Note that this elasticity is evaluated at the initial equilibrium value of j i . I use is to denote the cost-share of factor s, as usual. Assuming a small country facing constant …nal goods prices p, the zero pro…t conditions 11) imply
Combining these two equations, our globalization scenario now emerges as
At …rst sight, the comparative statics may seem ambiguous, since i > 0 and ! i < 0 are of opposite signs. However, these two elasticities are intimately related to each other, and it is relatively straightforward from plain intuition that i > j! i j. The elasticity i measures the extent to which expanding the scope of o¤shoring increases the marginal o¤shoring-cost z i (j). The elasticity ! i measures the extent to which doing so increases the entire factor cost savings from o¤shoring, relative to all-home-production, measured through the "o¤shoring-savings-factor" S i < 1. Both elasticities are evaluated for equilibrium values where the …rst-order-condition on j i is satis…ed. This condition requires that the marginal e¤ects would just o¤set each other, but since S i includes the infra-marginal savings e¤ects which are smaller (due to the assumption that 0 i (j) > 0), the marginal e¤ect measured by i must dominate the e¤ect on S i in absolute value: i > j! i j, whence ! i /( i + ! i ) < 0. It should be noticed that the left hand side of (15) is the percentage increase of the e¤ective price, as de…ned in (8) , that is brought about by a^ i -percent reduction in the o¤shoring cost. Thus, the productivity e¤ects may equivalently be expressed as an increase in the e¤ective price 14 Equation (15) is intuitive, both directly and also from the notion of an e¤ective price change. If …rms in a certain industry already engage in o¤shoring, i.e., if j i > 0, any across the board reduction in "gluing-costs"through^ i < 0 acts just like an increase in the price of the good, given that ! i /( i + ! i ) < 0, as demonstrated before. 15 An alternative way to describe the same e¤ect is to say that o¤shoring makes domestic factors used in an industry uniformly more productive. The strength of the e¤ect depends on how far the industry 14 I have emphasized this perspective already in Kohler (2003 Kohler ( ,2004 , but without o¤ering an explicit solution for^ i . 15 See Kohler (2003) where I have …rst pointed out that o¤shoring may be seen in this way.
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has already gone in terms of the scope of o¤shoring. This is because of the inframarginal e¤ect of making all those tasks cheaper to obtain that have already been sourced abroad, prior to the fall in i . If f i (j) is uniform, this e¤ect is measured through the margin j i alone. If f i (j) varies across j, meaning that some tasks are inherently more important for production than others, then this e¤ect is the larger, the more important the tasks that have been delocalized to start with. Moreover, the strength of the e¤ect depends on the steepness of the z i (j)-schedule. Taken together, the strength of this equivalent-priceincrease for a given size of the shock is given through the term ! i /( i + ! i ) < 0.
As regards the general equilibrium e¤ects, we may now invoke Stolper-Samuelson logic to pin down the wage e¤ects of o¤shoring, provided that the economy is and remains diversi…ed. The diversi…cation condition matters because any change in j i also a¤ects the full employment conditions, since less domestic labor is now used to generate outputs y 1 and y 2 . Under our assumption of constant input coe¢ cients across all tasks, both types of labor are a¤ected symmetrically. O¤shoring just acts like a sector-biased technological change, which may be equivalently be treated as an e¤ective change in the supply of both types of labor. In our case, this happens in a disproportional way, but as long as this does not push the economy outside its cone of diversi…cation, the wage e¤ects are determined in the familiar way from the zero-pro…t-conditions alone.
With a view on the fundamental distinction between two di¤erent concepts of o¤-shoring introduced above, it should now be instructive to compare this expression with the corresponding result in Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006). To have a meaningful comparison, we need to look at the more general case where they allow for trade in tasks for both low-and high-skilled labor. For this case, their zero-pro…t-conditions read as (in terms of our notation)
where S s is de…ned by analogy to (12), the only di¤erence being that they assume f s (j)
to be uniform with measure 1, now relating to input s = fh; lg, and not to industry i = f1; 2g, as in our model. The comparative statics on j s in their case simply requirê
s , where s is de…ned by analogy to i above. For constant goods prices p i the two equations (16) uniquely determine equilibrium domestic factor costs for each of the two factors, high-and low-skilled labor, w h S h [j h (w h )] and w l S l [j l (w l )], respectively.
Hence, comparative statics must obeyŵ s =Ŝ s , independently for both s = h and s = l.
O¤shoring of the two types of tasks takes place with no connection whatsoever between these two phenomena. 16 This is a stark separation property for input-speci…c o¤shoring which, obviously, does not hold for industry-speci…c o¤shoring.
What are the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis? A …rst point to be made in view of the counter-intuitive results that I have emphasized in Kohler (2003) and Kohler (2007) is that these are ruled out here because of the continuity imposed on o¤shoring through assuming a continuum of tasks. The above analysis looks at small changes where all "pathologies"behind counter-intuitive results are ruled out.
However, with a view on the empirical literature it must still be emphasized that some of the direct intuition often invoked is misleading. As has often been pointed out by trade economists in the debate about "trade and wages", in open economies wages are determined by prices through the zero-pro…t-conditions, more than by quantities -say quantities traded. In the present context a similar point obtains for o¤shoring. More speci…cally, we may have an industry where in a given period (sample) a lot of action takes place in terms of going o¤shore, and we may be con…dent that it is all a story about^ i < 0. Yet, if this happens at a "young age" of o¤shoring, with j i close to zero at the outset, then we should not be surprised to …nd small e¤ects on wages. In other words, when we estimate the role of o¤shoring through an empirical implementation of zero-pro…t-conditions like (15) above, we should also attempt to observe, by whatever proxi might be available, the terms ! i /( i + ! i ) across industries.
And it does matter from the above whether o¤shoring is of one or the other type, tasks that are idiosyncratic for industries, or tasks that are idiosyncratic to certain types of labor. For the latter type of o¤shoring, we do have a somewhat counter-intuitive result that o¤shoring of tasks that strictly require low-skilled labor raises the domestic wage for low-skilled labor. The same applies, independently, for o¤shoring of strictly highskill-labor-tasks. As with other results that appear counter-intuitive at …rst sight, closer inspection reveals Stolper-Samuelson logic at work. If the e¤ective cost of domestic lowskilled labor falls, because of cheaper availability of low-skilled-labor-tasks sourced abroad, this bene…ts the low-skilled-labor-intensive industry more than the other industry, and the only way to restore zero-pro…ts is through an o¤setting rise in the domestic wage for 16 See section 4 of Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b) for more details.
low-skilled labor. Again, the same logic applies independently for high-skilled-labor-tasks.
And in either case the e¤ect would be much smaller at "early stages" of o¤shoring than for later stages where j i is already "large".
A further point relates to welfare and real wages. With strictly input-speci…c o¤-shoring, we would always observe a rise in real wages for both types of labor. O¤shoring is a Pareto-improving event. The same does not hold true for industry-speci…c o¤shoring where the Stolper-Samuelson logic applies in a more familiar way. For this type of o¤-shoring to be a Pareto-improvement, it would have to be su¢ ciently symmetric in terms
being not too di¤erent in absolute magnitude across industries.
And …nally, as regards the productivity e¤ect that has also been the object of empirical analysis, 17 in this model all productivity-equivalent gains are absorbed by factor price changes. It is thus di¢ cult to imagine how productivity gains would show up in an empirical analysis. Of course, there is much more to data than this model can identify.
In particular, productivity e¤ects at the industry level may be due to …rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003), which is ruled out here altogether. However, there is a certain similarity between the new literature on heterogeneity-driven productivity e¤ects that work through …rm selection. As I have suggested in Kohler (2007) , we may re-interpret our t i (j) schedule as incorporating a varying degree of Ricardian comparative advantage, driven by productivity-di¤erences, across di¤erent tasks, in addition to the o¤shoring-cost emphasized above. In this case, enhanced globalization also elicits selection of, and enhanced concentration on, tasks where domestic …rms have a larger degree of comparative advantage. Indeed, we may even view our continuum of tasks as also involving a continuum of di¤erent …rms. The question then remains how to de…ne productivity in such a way that we may detect a productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring, not in addition to factor price e¤ects, but as a di¤erent, but equivalent, way of observing the same phenomenon -realizing that the factor price e¤ects are essentially mandated from the productivity e¤ects of o¤shoring. 
4 Globalization: A Less Benign Interpretation
In the preceeding section, the globalization scenario was essentially good news since it has involved easier access to cheap things from abroad. In this section, I want to take a somewhat less benign perspective on globalization. Thus, suppose that due to enhanced world supply of good 1, its price falls on world markets. Domestic …rms in industry 1 will perceive this as an increase in competitive pressure, and they will have to adjust.
For the economy as a whole, this requires an adjustment in wage rates, as well as factor reallocation across industries which may be costly, and may involve temporary unemployment. From a general equilibrium perspective, in a two-goods-model it only makes sense to look at the relative price. Without loss of generality, I shall therefore look at a fall in the relative price of good 1 by normalizing p 2 = 1. I do not want to take a stance as to whether this constitutes a terms-of-trade improvement or a terms-of-trade deterioration, although one can easily portray the scenario in that way by assuming an appropriate demand and trade pattern. However, my story is not a terms-of-trade story, but a story of structural adjustment of a country's production, dictated by some exogenous change in world market prices. Of course, the story might just as well be told as one of a price increase, in which case it might look more benign. But globalization here is still less benign than in the previous section, simply because it now is a two-sided coin, as each relative price change is, whereas before it was one-sided in that there was an improvement in technology. An issue that is not usually addressed, but which may be important, is whether the long-run decline of a certain industry in terms of employment goes hand in hand with a gradual reduction also in production depth. One might be inclined to assume that it does, but the subsequent analysis reveals that the opposite is also possible, whereby an ever smaller number of people employed in an industry carry out an ever larger set of tasks, covering an ever larger range of production stages. In a similar vein, if a country acquires comparative advantage in some industry, will this necessarily happen in the form of a gradual increase not only in employment, but also in the number of production stages carried out domestically? Or might the industry increase in size (employment) through specialization on an ever smaller subset of production stages? Arguably, adjustment costs may be quite di¤erent in the two forms of restructuring. I shall not, however, model such costs explicitly in this paper.
With Leontief-type technology, goods price changes normally do not entail any reallocation at all. Under ‡exible prices, all adjustment takes place in factor price space, until -in the extreme case -one of the two factors has a zero shadow value and production adjusts in a discrete way towards complete specialization. To allow for a more interesting story of quantity adjustment, we need to return to the more general model where there is a systematic variation of skill-intensity across the continuum of tasks in both industries considered. In this case, o¤shoring makes the skill-intensity variable. But even if tasks are homogeneous in terms of skill-intensity, the conclusion from the above analysis would be that o¤shoring introduces an element of continuity into adjustment through the rising cost-schedule t i (j). Moreover, the previous analysis seems to suggest that an exogenous price increase (reduction) should have the e¤ect of a reduction (increase) in o¤shoring. This follows from the fact that o¤shoring is the equivalent, in terms of the zero-pro…t-conditions, of a price increase. Hence, a price reduction may partly be undone through o¤shoring. However, in this section I want to show a special feature of adjustment that arises in the more appealing case where tasks are heterogeneous in terms of their skill-intensity.
It will prove useful for the subsequent analysis to introduce the following de…nitions, relying on the notions of average and marginal skill-intensity introduced in (5) above. I shall call industry 1 strongly more skill-intensive than industry 2, if it features both, a higher average and a higher marginal skill intensity than industry 2, for given external margins of o¤shoring, j 1 and j 2 . I call industry 1 weakly more skill intensive, if at the given levels of j i its average skill intensity is higher, but its marginal skill intensity is lower than in industry 2's average skill-intensity. And …nally, industry 1 is called globally more skill intensive than industry 2, if its marginal skill intensities over the entire range of It is important a the outset to note that our scenario is an exogenous reduction in the relative price of a good which is relatively skill-intensive in the average sense. In the conventional scenario we would expect a decline in employment of both types of labor in this industry, and a reallocation towards industry 2. This happens through the equilibrium wage adjustments which make high-skilled labor relatively cheaper, thus making both industries more skill-intensive. And full employment then requires a contraction of the more skill-intensive of the two industries. As a …rst step, let us thus look at notional wage adjustments that would maintain the zero-pro…t conditions in the face of dp 1 < 0 without any change in the margin of o¤shoring. Assuming diversi…cation, using (7) this type of wage adjustment is described by dp
where the second equation explicitly states that the price of good two has been normalized to p 2 = 1. Note that by construction of my argument the factor cost for delocalized tasks on the left-hand side of (7) remain unchanged. We might call it the incipient wage adjustment. Now suppose that industry 1 is weakly more skill-intensive than industry 2 at the initial levels of o¤shoring j i and domestic wage rates, w h and w l , respectively.
This means thatã
, where the average skill-intensities are de…ned as in (5) above, and where a 1s [j i (w h ; w l )] denotes the s-type labor input-coe¢ cient at the initial margin j i , with s = h; l. Remember that j i satis…es the …rst-order-condition of cost-minimization through localization of tasks (10) .
Obviously, under these skill-intensity assumptions, the wage changes from (17) feature a fall in w h and a rise in w l , such that minimum-cost of industry 2 remains constant. Since the marginal task of industry 1 features a lower skill-intensity than industry 2 does on the average of its tasks, this implies that the factor cost of that task must rise. The reason is that a lower skill-intensity makes it less well positioned to gain from a relative reduction of the high-skilled wage rate. From (10) it then follows that these notional wage adjustments are no equilibrium reactions, since they violate the …rst-order-condition. More speci…cally, the rise in w l and fall in w h are such that the domestic economy loses its competitive edge on the marginal task j i of the skill-intensive industry 1, and cost-minimization requires that further tasks are delocalized o¤shore. The same holds true for the less skillintensive industry 2, since by de…nition each industry's average skill-intensity is larger than its marginal skill-intensity. In other words, equilibrium adjustment in this case requires enhanced o¤shoring in both industries. Both industries thus become more skillintensive in the process of adjustment, although for "small changes" industry 1 remains the more skill-intensive of the two on the average of all tasks performed domestically.
The equilibrium wage adjustment is in line with the Stolper-Samuelson logic, although di¤erent from that described in equations (17) above.
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The opposite holds true for industry 1, if it is strongly more skill-intensive than industry 2, and a fortiori if it is globally more skill-intensive. In this case we observe a partial reversal of o¤shoring in industry 1, since notional the wage adjustment according to (17) now implies that industry 1 actually gains a competitive edge on the marginal task. The opposite still holds true for industry 2 (as in the previous case), by de…nition of the average skill-intensity in (5). Hence, equilibrium adjustment must now involve less o¤shoring in industry 1, and more o¤shoring in industry 2. As a result, industry 1 becomes less skill-intensive, while industry 2 becomes more skill-intensive. The factor-intensity e¤ect of o¤shoring thus reduces the skill-intensity di¤erence between the two industries. This, in turn, implies that the Stolper-Samuelson logic, although still in force, implies a somewhat mitigated adjustment, compared to a case where o¤shoring is ruled out. As regards overall resource allocation, we lose the Rybczynski-type logic which normally implies contraction of industry 1 and expansion of industry 2. The reason is that, the factor intensities of the two industries now move in opposite directions.
To draw a somewhat more general conclusion, it is important to realize the speci…c nature of the scenario considered. In our model, industry 1 might be called a comparative advantage industry, because it is relatively skill-intensive on the average of tasks and the home economy has relatively cheap high-skilled labor. This industry faces increased competitive pressure from a fall in the price of good 1. Somewhat paradoxically, the conventional type of adjustment obtains, if the industry is the less skill-intensive at the margin of o¤shoring than the other industry on is average. The intuition is that in this case the incipient rise in w l and fall in w h harms the industry also at its o¤shoring margin.
If the industry is skill-intensive also at this margin, then the incipient wage e¤ects lead to opposite movements in the skill-intensities of the two industries that mitigate the StolperSamuelson logic and potentially negate the Rybczynski-logic for factor reallocation.
Suppose that we have an exogenous relative price increase of industry 1, rather than a price reduction. Then the wage e¤ects described by (17) , with dp 1 > 0, now go the other way, with a rise in w h and a fall in w l . Reiterating the logic of the preceding argument, we would conclude that if industry 1 is weakly more skill-intensive its reaction would involve a partial reversal of o¤shoring. The reason is that it is relatively less skill-intensive in terms of the task at the relevant margin of o¤shoring, hence it is less a¤ected by the changes dw h > 0 and dw l < 0 from (17) . The same holds true, by de…nition of average skill intensities as in (5), for industry 2. From Rybczynski-type logic, industry 1 expands, while industry 2 contracts. If industry 1 is strongly more skill-intensive, then these same wage adjustments would imply that industry 1 loses its competitive edge at the initial margin of o¤shoring, and would therefore react by delocalizing more tasks o¤shore, while the opposite holds true for industry 2. Thus, adjustment implies an increase in factorintensity di¤erences. The result is that the Stolper-Samuelson logic gets reinforced, and the Rybczynski-type logic is lost, potentially at least.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis for empirical work is that it makes relatively little sense to search for an unambiguous relationship between changes in the extent of an industry's level of o¤shoring, and changes in employment or more generally its level of activity. Everything depends on the type of exogenous shock that drives the data.
O¤shoring and employment, together with the wage e¤ects, are all jointly endogenous, and ignoring this endogeneity in the estimation process, without bothering about the type of exogenous shock that generates the variation observed in the data, leads to potentially meaningless results.
The preceding analysis indicates a rich pattern of possible industrial restructuring in a country that faces a change in world prices for traded …nal goods, and whose …rms engage in o¤shoring to countries where low-skilled labor is relatively cheap. The underlying assumption was that o¤shoring is an industry-speci…c phenomenon involving heterogeneous 
responds in the familiar way to goods price changes. With given foreign wage rates and given o¤shoring margins j i , this disturbs the o¤shoring condition. By necessity, it does so in both sectors, and the o¤shoring margins of the two industries will always move in the same direction.
More speci…cally, from (16), the factor cost changes following a change in p 1 must satisfy the familiar magni…cation relationship of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. I.e., under the assumption that industry 1 is relatively skill intensive,p 1 < 0 must be associated with a fall in w h S h [j h (w h )], and a rise in w l S l [j l (w l )]. Now, since the extensive margins j s are increasing in the respective wage rates, and S 0 s < 0, and since we now assume a constant o¤shoring-cost and a constant foreign wage rate, a fall in w h will be associated with a rise in S h , i.e., a partial reversal o¤shoring. This is intuitive, since a lower domestic wage for high-skilled labor makes the domestic economy competitive at the initial margin of o¤shoring. Whether or not this is an equilibrium adjustment depends on whether it is true thatŵ h + ! h| h < 0, withŵ h < 0. From the …rst order condition of o¤shoring which in this case states that w h = w h = [ h z h (j h )], we have| h =ŵ h = h . Hence the condition is satis…ed, ifŵ h (1 + ! h = h ) < 0, which in turn implies ! h = h > 1, which is equivalent to h > ! h , or h > j! h j. Now, we know that h > 0 and ! h < 0; and in section 3 above we have also shown that the equivalent of condition h > j! h j is satis…ed for the industryspeci…c notion of o¤shoring. By analogy, it is also satis…ed in the present context. From 22 all of this it then follows that, for an equilibrium adjustment top 1 < 0, we do haveŵ h < 0 withŜ h > 0 , and conversely for low-skilled labor whereŵ l > 0 andŜ l < 0. We may thus conclude that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem remains valid in qualitative terms for the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg world of o¤shoring. 19 For the reallocation e¤ects it is now important to realize that the full employment conditions are given by
From the previous paragraph we know that S h is rising, while S l is falling, in identical ways for both industries. Denoting the familiar employment shares by is :=
we may write the relative changes as
From this, we may directly conclude that output levels respond as in the Rybczynski-type magni…cation e¤ect:ŷ 1 < Ŝ h < 0 < Ŝ l <ŷ 2 . This is as expected. However, it relates to …nal output levels, not to employment of labor in the two industries. As emphasized above, overall employment in industry 1 falls, as perhaps expected, if both industries become more skill-intensive in the process of adjustment, with the skill-intensity measured 
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Stories of o¤shoring di¤er for two non-trivial reasons. First, the underlying view of the o¤shoring phenomenon may di¤er, and secondly, the scenario looked at in theoretical models, or the exogenous changes behind the data used in empirical work, may di¤er. If these di¤erences are made explicit, then the di¤erent stories should not cause confusion.
However, in empirical work at least, this is often not the case. And theoretical models usually subscribe, more or less arbitrarily, to a speci…c, single notion of o¤shoring. Moreover, they mostly look at scenarios where o¤shoring arises (sometimes from a case without o¤shoring to start with) due to an exogenous reduction of o¤shoring-costs. O¤shoring as an ingredient to adjustment of other types of shocks has received little attention. The empirical literature very often investigates the e¤ects of o¤shoring on variables like wages and employment which are jointly endogenous with o¤shoring itself. If two variables are jointly endogenous, their co-movement depends on the type of exogenous shock that drives this movement. Unless the researcher is explicit about this, results are di¢ cult to interpret, and one should not be too surprised that the stories reported di¤er.
In this paper, I have identi…ed two di¤erent types of o¤shoring that are both amenable to general equilibrium analysis featuring several types of labor and may, thus, be compared in a rigorous way for the same type of scenario, focusing on distribution and factor allocation. Moreover, I have looked at two di¤erent scenarios to exemplify that the comovement of o¤shoring on the one hand, and wages and employment on the other heavily depends on the type of underlying shock.
O¤shoring may be related to tasks that are speci…c to certain types of labor. All types of labor may be subject to o¤shoring, but the tasks of low-skilled labor may be delocalized independently from the tasks performed by high-skilled labor. This is the For empirical work, my analysis suggests that the speci…cation of estimation equations for both, wage and employment e¤ects, and the speci…c estimation technique chosen, should be sensitive with respect to the fact that o¤shoring, as well as wages and employment, are all jointly endogenous. Moreover, the empirical approach should allow for a distinction between the two types of o¤shoring. For the industry-speci…c form of o¤shoring, the speci…c ways in which industry-characteristics determine the wage and employment e¤ects identi…ed in the present analysis should be, and can be, taken into account in the empirical speci…cation.
